Letters to the Next U.S. President: Advice on Trade Geopolitics Energy and More
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Close September 9, 2024, 12:02 AM Comment iconView Comments ()From Martin Kimani, executive director of New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and former Kenyan ambassador to the United Nations
A photo illustration shows red and blue boxing gloves holding a U.S.-shaped Constitution with “We the People” on it.Mariaelena Caputi illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Americans,
You are the only ones who can choose between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump this November, but your decision will ripple across the world. It will decide war or peace, tyranny or democracy, poverty or prosperity far beyond your borders. For a century, the United States has been at the center of global events. It has championed humanitarian action, economic development, human rights, and democracy. The U.S. victory against fascism in 1945 defined the world.
But your country has also broken international law and pursued disastrous wars and coups. Whether defensible or not, its actions have been driven by a strong political center, supported by a bipartisan understanding of America’s role in the world. Now, that center has been shaken—perhaps even broken—by hyperpartisan politics.
Before the January 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, I had never imagined that the United States could be vulnerable to major postelection violence. Now, millions of people worldwide, myself included, fear that the November election is at risk of fraud, intimidation, and a contested transfer of power. An America consumed by internal political wars and unable to meet its global commitments would create a geopolitical vacuum. Rising powers such as China, determined to end U.S. dominance, would likely fill this void. The trend toward authoritarianism could accelerate, leaving millions more people disempowered and endangered.
Harris and Trump should be pressed on their understanding of how much U.S. democracy is harmed by the country’s pursuit of supremacy, which necessarily demands a national security establishment that frustrates citizen oversight, an entrenched foreign-policy elite quick to resort to force and slow to pursue diplomacy, and an imperial presidency. But regardless of their answers, the United States will lose its global influence in the event of a crisis during or after the November election that destroys its ability to solve problems at home.
Some of my African friends have noted that the situation in the United States is beginning to resemble elections in their own countries, where fear looms due to the threat of violence, fueled by politicians weaponizing ethnic or religious identities. Americans may not think struggling democracies have much to offer them, but lessons must be learned from the unlikeliest corners. Certainly, my country, Kenya, has faced—and tried to resolve—more than its fair share of electoral crises.
In August 2017, Kenya held a general election. The results were annulled by the Supreme Court due to irregularities and illegalities in the transmission of results. We had suffered a civic breakdown a decade earlier, resulting in more than a thousand fatalities and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. So the decision by the court reopened the door to a crisis we had only recently escaped.
The court ordered a rerun that October, but the opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, withdrew, claiming that the electoral commission had not made sufficient reforms to ensure a free and fair election. That withdrawal handed incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta an easy victory. The opposition responded with rallies and protests to delegitimize the government and its institutions. Fringe politicians took center stage, and tensions rose as voices within the opposition called for secession.
One morning in February 2018, as political unrest continued to roil Kenya, I received a call with instructions to drive to a villa in Nairobi. As a security official, I was accustomed to receiving sensitive tasks, but I still was surprised when I found Kenyatta seated with Odinga. The only other person in the meeting was one of Odinga’s most trusted aides. The principals informed us that they had been meeting secretly to address the political crisis. They had concluded that Kenya could not sustain its democracy without working together to resolve the underlying disagreements that so often led to postelection violence.
Our instructions were to take their key observations and turn them into an agenda for change. Guided by them, and after much passionate debate, we produced a nine-point agenda committed to addressing foundational challenges—including making our electoral system fit for purpose, combating high-level corruption, and building an economy where the gains benefited the entire country, not just those favored by those in power.
A month later, Kenyatta and Odinga held a press conference where they issued the points we had agreed on in a communiqué titled “Building Bridges to a New Kenyan Nation.” A nation on the brink of civil and political violence was instantly calmed as two former foes shook hands and committed to a bipartisan process of reform and change.
The handshake helped Kenyans realize that their long-lasting political rivalries—and the intense feelings of outrage and even hatred they felt—were driven by deeper dynamics than the actions of two leaders or parties. They were presented with a practical agenda for transformation, supported by the country’s major political figures. The communiqué was then handed to a national task force to develop a comprehensive report for government adoption that would propose legal and constitutional changes.
The task force traveled across the country, engaging thousands of citizens from all walks of life. Although the courts, once again displaying an admirable independence, later halted the process on constitutional and procedural grounds, the effort was successful in averting the kind of crisis we had experienced after previous elections. Today, Kenya is navigating a political storm caused by some of the same fundamental problems that prompted our efforts in 2018.
Just as Kenya grappled with the challenges of political division, the United States, too, stands at a crossroads where the stability of its democracy is at risk. Framing this election as an existential battle, the leading candidates and parties are on a perilous path. Misinformation and disinformation are being issued at industrial scale, eroding trust in institutions and shared solutions. These tools may also be used in November to delegitimize the tabulation and transmission of electoral results. And in a country where surveys show that too many citizens believe in the utility of political violence, there is a real risk of localized, and potentially more severe, breakdowns in public order.
As important as the choice is between Harris and Trump, the truth is that the roots of America’s dangerously divided politics run deeper than their contest. They can only be addressed through a bipartisan effort that prioritizes the political center over the extremes. This will require a series of interconnected efforts across the United States that create avenues for dialogue among radically opposed political groupings and allow for the joint identification of shared values and common purpose. It means that Americans must do more than vote and retreat in order for this great experiment in a government “of the people, by the people, for the people” to survive. Democracy is a delicate flower, unendingly exposed to harsh winds. Nurturing and protecting it is a mission for every generation.
Americans must demand bridge-building from your leaders. You must insist that their political agendas acknowledge the essential humanity and grievances of the opposition. In so doing, you will embrace the frustrations of compromise and the pragmatism required to sustain a free and secure American republic.
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Pencil drawn portraits of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are overlapped, one in blue and one in red.Pencil drawn portraits of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are overlapped, one in blue and one in red.
Essay
Is 2024 Really the Most Important Election in History?
Democracy—and the global system—might not be so easily dismantled. By Michael Hirsh
Isolationism Doesn’t Protect
From Arancha González, dean of Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs and former Spanish foreign minister
An illustration shows a U.S. flag umbrella sheltering a tiny globe.Nicolás Ortega illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Americans,
You will soon go to the polls to elect your next president. And once again, the rest of the world will be holding its breath. I will be following the vote count with a mix of admiration, expectation, and concern: admiration for your democracy and its ability to reinvent itself even when faced with serious challenges; expectation because the United States is a model that we all want to follow; concern about your temptation to isolationism. In a nutshell, your choice matters to you and your future but also to millions of people around the world, including in Europe. I hope, therefore, you will not mind me humbly providing unsolicited advice.
Your biggest asset is trust: the faith you have in yourselves and your ability to overcome and the confidence that your friends and allies around the world place in you—the dynamism of your economy, your capacity to innovate and develop cutting-edge technologies, the strength of your defense sector, the checks and balances of your democracy, and your support for international cooperation to address collective challenges, from nuclear proliferation to climate change and from poverty eradication to pandemics.
But that trust has been severely dented in recent years. At home, some of you depict a nation in decline, portraying a scared mouse where we see a roaring lion. And these last years have seen a serious erosion in the trust that many around the world have in the United States, too. We have seen unilateralism and economic protectionism and have been confronted with a purely transactional approach from some of you, including in the sacrosanct sector of defense in NATO. We have seen the United States undermining the same multilateral system that it helped build.
It is time you double down on regaining the trust of your friends and allies. They will make you stronger and safer. Investing in developing the European pillar within NATO and cooperating on the defense industry with European nations will not only ensure that Europe takes responsibility for its defense, but it will also strengthen the United States to project its power globally, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Joining hands in the decarbonization of the trans-Atlantic economy, as opposed to deploying unfair schemes against European companies, will help us all reduce our carbon emissions faster and provide greater benefits to our companies. Helping to craft global rules on digital trade at the World Trade Organization stands to benefit, first and foremost, U.S. tech giants operating worldwide. Taxing and regulating the tech sector as well as building guardrails for artificial intelligence will be more effective if done in concert and will also be fairer. Leading in the United Nations or in international institutions on issues such as financing the green transition in developing countries will help stabilize the economies of many of your friends and neighbors. When they do better, the United States benefits, too. In a world more intertwined than ever before, isolationism doesn’t protect. Disengaging from Ukraine sends a message not just to Russia; China reads it, too. Disengaging from NATO is heard not just in Brussels; it is felt in the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan as well as the Middle East.
And the denting of U.S. democracy is not just an issue in Washington; it resonates across Europe, too. Your biggest weakness is your democracy and open society. I say weakness not because I would wish for an authoritarian America but because openness makes you—as well as us—more susceptible to disinformation and manipulation. As in much of Europe, democracy in the United States faces challenges of election interference, growing polarization, threats against journalists, and the spread of manipulative information. AI has helped magnify this challenge with the exponential capacity to develop lifelike fakes aimed at misleading citizens. The enemy is within, and it is very good at finding like-minded allies across Europe. But foreign interference abounds as well.
It is worth investing in a shield that would protect and preserve democracy for future generations. This will require a combination of measures including bolstering cybersecurity; regulating social media platforms and introducing transparency in algorithms; providing warnings and counterarguments for misinformation before citizens face it; and strengthening U.S. election systems, including election certification processes and protecting the right to vote. Ultimately, it is about empowering each and every citizen to serve as a custodian of democracy. Democratic forces in Europe and in the United States could benefit from joining hands and sharing experiences.
You have in your hands the decision about who will be the next president of the United States. As you prepare to vote, Europeans will start a new political cycle, too, with a recently elected European Parliament voting on the program of work to be led by the European Commission. The uncertainty around us has made us realize that our destiny will be shaped by what we do next. We are determined to protect our democracy, step up our defense, and bolster our prosperity for the benefit of all citizens. We know the task is daunting, and we will have to show strong determination and unity to meet it. I am confident we will. But I also know that we will both be stronger if we trust and respect each other, if we work hand in hand to protect our democracies, and if we can still count on the United States as our ally.
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Take Care of Your People
From Danny Quah, Li Ka Shing professor in economics and dean of the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
An illustration shows a No. 1 foam finger with a bandage around its fingertip.Matt Chase illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Madam or Mr. President,
Congratulations on leading the United States in a political refresh. From here in Southeast Asia, we have for decades admired and valued your country’s many gifts to the world. The United States gained our admiration by sharing with us your American Dream, showing how you succeeded, and leading by example.
But there is no denying that things have changed. Even the outcomes for which you early on fought—multilateralism, or a level playing field; a jointly stronger world economy—now seem to work against you. Toward the end of the 20th century, you advanced three grand ideas: political convergence, economic efficiency, and comparative advantage. These promised a more prosperous and egalitarian global society. But they have not delivered the outcomes for which you had wished. That must be dispiriting and exhausting.
However, I believe the world can continue to work well for you and, indeed, for all of us. To succeed, we only have to avoid gridlock. We don’t have to explicitly cooperate or even agree.
I have three suggestions.
First, ask yourself what really matters; forget that talk about being the world’s No. 1. Do you know what will happen to the American people’s way of life and the U.S. system of government if you become No. 2? Absolutely nothing.
It makes exactly no difference to how we in Southeast Asia behave and engage with you or with China or with anyone else. We understand that a country might be No. 1 because it truly excels. Or it might be No. 1 just because it deliberately keeps others from rising. You come to Southeast Asia and ask us to choose between you and China, invoking the image of the both of you locked in great-power competition. We have already said we will not choose.
Second, what we think really matters is to take care of your people. The plight of the unfortunate, the weak, and the vulnerable in your own society doesn’t fit the success you claim for your national economic and social development. Why is your system so underperforming that the bottom 50 percent of your population today is barely better off than it was decades ago?
Third, be at ease in the world. This doesn’t mean closing yourselves off to where you are only surrounded by friends to your north and south and by fish to your east and west. Nor are we asking for the other extreme, that you run around the world looking to pitch in on every single global public-good project. That is a sure formula for overreach.
Instead, we want you to pursue only your self-interest. As economist Adam Smith pointed out in The Wealth of Nations, we expect food on our dinner table not because we think the butcher, brewer, or baker benevolent. It is precisely because we know they are self-interested that we rely on them for our meals.
We in Southeast Asia ask only for inadvertent cooperation. In our region, we already practice this. Different individual nations have overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. Even though everyone’s interests are obviously in mutual conflict and each of us has our own agenda, we nonetheless were able to come together with a collective agreement over that body of water. By contrast, trying to get cooperation through agreement doesn’t generally work because concordance can be difficult to reach. The Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, over which we and you labored for years, quickly dissolved when at the last minute you alone decided it didn’t work for you. When full cooperation is needed, not quite reaching it can be an epic fail.
Next, let me be frank. We don’t want you running around pitching in everywhere because sometimes when you do that, you mess things up. When you don’t have your heart in a project or you’re not particularly good at it or you don’t understand what the rest of us want, feel free to step back into friends-and-fish territory. We are quite comfortable with plurilateralism, where we each keep to our own side of the fence regarding those problem domains where we would otherwise disagree. The world does not have to be all multi- lateralism all the time.
Here’s how these three suggestions might translate into policy. Remember that Southeast Asians go by evidence. When we see what you proclaim to be true, say no more; we’re in. But show it—don’t shout it.
Once you give up on the obsession with being No. 1, your engagement with China no longer needs to be confrontational. There is a win-win outcome possible here, where China continues to become richer and you enjoy economic security.
Your leading diplomats have talked about the ebb and flow of democracy in your own nation. Antony Blinken, prior to becoming secretary of state, noted how even as democracy was in retreat around the world, so too in America, with then-President Donald Trump “taking a two-by-four to its institutions, its values, and its people every day.” Yet for so long you were so convinced that your political and social values were universalist—and that your brand of democracy was robust and resilient.
If the level playing field built on multilateralism and globalization—wonderful ideas and institutions that you gifted the world—is being undermined by those who don’t obey the rules, the right solution is to figure out why this system is so fragile and easily manipulated. It is not the right solution to have your protectionist, anti-globalization forces tear down a system that has brought hundreds of millions of people around the world out of poverty and provided opportunity for continued advancement here in Southeast and East Asia.
There will be those around you who insist on calling this time of U.S.-China rivalry a new cold war. Resist that language. In the 20th-century Cold War between you and the Soviet Union, your antagonist attempted to provide an ideology and a socioeconomic system that threatened the American people’s way of life and undermined the U.S. idea of government. Today, Beijing, for all its faults, comes nowhere close to having any such designs on U.S. society and government. In today’s rivalry with China, you face the threat of losing American jobs, of U.S. industries being dismantled, of ghost towns emerging out of where your middle-class communities now thrive. No one ever saw anything like this in your contest with the Soviets. Calling this time a cold war is an attempt at reviving a playbook that worked once against a different rival.
From Southeast Asia, we recognize that there is a two-way causality and an interconnectedness between your domestic challenges and your international conduct.
Improving the well-being of the weak and vulnerable in your society and providing them opportunity through strong domestic public institutions and infrastructure and open world-class universities will help not just your own social cohesion and fabric but again make you both our envy and idol.
In 1967, Richard Nixon wrote of China: “There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.” Ever since then, we have worked hard to build a world that made room for a rising China. In Southeast Asia and in all the rest of the world, we don’t now have the capacity to build a world that also makes room for a dysfunctional and insecure United States. We want America in our world—just as we want China in it, too.
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Play by the Rules
From Joseph E. Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in economics and professor at Columbia University
An illustration shows a US flag on a stand inside of the wire frames of a cube box.Nicolás Ortega illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Madam or Mr. President,
The United States has in recent years made a major U-turn.
After decades of telling other countries that they should not undertake industrial policies, our country under President Joe Biden enacted two massive bills: the Chips and Science Act, to promote U.S. production of a crucial component of any 21st-century economy; and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which, in spite of its name, was really about the country beginning its green transition and capturing, for itself, more green jobs. The scale of the acts is enormous—for Chips and Science, some quarter of a trillion dollars, and the IRA, originally estimated at one-third of a trillion dollars, is now thought to be in the order of $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion. The acts are having one desired effect: The called-for investments seem to be occurring, in some cases on a very large scale.
Of course, Washington has always pursued industrial policies, but they were typically hidden, often in the Defense Department. What is really new is that the United States has brought them out into the open.
Critics may carp that the bang for the buck was low (that is, the amount of additional investment elicited for each dollar of public spending was far smaller than one would have hoped), but with so many dollars being spent, the bang is significant.
Some critics may also complain that the government shouldn’t be in the business of picking winners, that we should leave it to the market. But the market has demonstrably shown its weaknesses: The COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, revealed a lack of resilience, with thin supply chains easily broken, inducing massive shortages and high and disruptive inflation. The market, with its massive pollution, has been central in bringing on climate change; it cannot be relied on to fix it. We understand, too, why the market has performed so, so badly: It never pays adequate attention to environmental externalities, and it is systematically shortsighted—something that we saw dramatically in the 2008 financial crisis.
The two acts may not have been ideal from the perspective of Washington and academic policy wonks, but both are far better than nothing—and given political gridlock, nothing was what many of us had expected.
Some viewed the U.S. policy of telling others not to engage in industrial policy while it did so itself as part of a strategy to ensure its technological competitive advantage. But new U.S. industrial policies are having another unintended side effect. They may represent the final nail in the coffin of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO was supposed to create a rules-based system that provided a level playing field in trade. In the decades after World War II, the United States championed the system and played a central role in writing the rules. But in recent years, Washington has found the rules inconvenient—too often, they don’t serve its purposes well. So first, the United States debilitated the WTO Appellate Body, refusing to allow the appointment of new judges until certain reforms were made. It seemed almost as if the country wanted to make sure that the judges always ruled in its favor; ruling against it was seemingly defined as “overreach.”
Now that it has defenestrated the Appellate Body, it has gone one step further, in an exercise of raw economic and political power: In those two acts, it blatantly violated rules, knowing that no one can or is likely to respond.
But this raises a deeper, and in some sense philosophical, question: Is there really an international rule of law when the large countries—the hegemons—obey the rules only when it suits them and when there is no enforcement mechanism or punishment for such rogue behavior, other than that arising from reputation loss (a loss that the United States clearly has decided is second order relative to the benefits of acting as it pleases)?
Making matters even worse is that during the pandemic, the WTO enforced its intellectual property rules in the interests of the profits of the pharmaceutical companies but to the detriment of the health, even lives, of those in the emerging markets and developing countries. Biden even called for a vaccine waiver, but the WTO remained adamant. “Profits over lives” seemed to be its motto. And this even though the principle that in the event of a pandemic, drugs should be made available to all, through compulsory licenses, was an essential part of the original WTO IP agreement. The drug companies had made the whole process so litigious and complicated that the pandemic would be over (and the profits pocketed) before poor countries could get access.
Thus, we have an international trade order that enforces rules against the poor and weak, even when it is a matter of lives, but in which the United States can do as it will.
You might say that’s the way the world works, a world in which power matters. But here’s why you, as president, need to care. The United States is no longer the hegemon. We are engaged in a new cold war, to win the hearts and minds of those in the global south. And entering this office, you face global issues that require global cooperation: preventing climate change, addressing pandemics, maintaining fisheries, preventing sea pollution and space debris. The list is long.
The problem is that this is not the only instance of big-power selfishness. The United States has pushed investment agreements so that its companies can engage with impunity in actions from pollution to selling unhealthy products—threatening that any new regulation to curb such anti-social activities will be met with a lawsuit, resolved through corporate-friendly arbitration, forcing poor countries to compensate the companies to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions, for not polluting, for not poisoning their citizens, or for not engaging in some other nefarious activity. It was only when the United States itself started to be sued under these investment agreements that it changed its tune. A major change as we went from the North American Free Trade Agreement to the new agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada was actually dropping most of the investment agreement provisions.
The United States also blocked the creation of a better mechanism to resolve sovereign debt, an issue of particular concern now with so many countries vulnerable to debt crises. In the absence of such a court-based system, power dominates, and power resides with the big private creditors, such as BlackRock; private creditors have exercised that power to squeeze poor countries.
A final example: The United States told countries all over the world to open their doors to foreign investment. This would create jobs, and those countries thought it would generate tax revenue from the profits associated with production. Little did they understand that the system of globalization that the United States had played such an important role in constructing was one designed for tax avoidance. Corporations had ample opportunities to shift profits to low-taxed jurisdictions, including tax and secrecy havens. The U.S. tech giants, so adept at producing goods and services that people loved, were even more adept at tax avoidance.
After the 2008 financial crisis, when everyone was in desperate need for money, even developed countries began an effort to reduce this tax avoidance (in strategies collectively called BEPS, or base erosion and profit shifting). But this effort was aimed at increasing taxes for those developed countries, not at creating a fair global tax system. It has largely failed. There has been an agreement on a minimum corporate tax—15 percent—but even that has been eviscerated by exemptions and carve-outs. Globally, there is pressure on countries to reduce their rates to the global minimum. What might have been an effort to raise tax revenues fairly has a good chance of actually reducing revenues in developing countries.
The abject failure of this effort, centered in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the think tank of the developed world), has resulted in a move to have new global discussions about taxation at the United Nations. The initiative, led by the African Union, received overwhelming support from the world last November, in spite of arm-twisting opposition by Washington. And now there are concerns, as the negotiations begin, that the United States is engaged in foot-dragging. So far, fortunately, those efforts have proved futile; on Aug. 16, the U.N. General Assembly voted to adopt a road map to a future tax convention—the United States was one of the few recalcitrant countries to vote against it.
I want to make this very clear: It is in the interest of the United States as a whole, of the American people, that there be a fair and effective global tax system; an IP system that ensures that poor people have access to drugs, especially during pandemics; and that all countries have the freedom to pass regulations to protect their citizens and the environment without shilling out large amounts to polluters and exploiters. In each of these areas, U.S. policy has been dictated, to too large an extent, by special corporate interests. If the United States is to win the new cold war, this must stop.
All of these illustrate how globalization under neoliberalism has gone awry. The economic foundations of neoliberalism—the notion that free markets lead to economic efficiency and shared prosperity—had been questioned even before the theory become fashionable. Now we see the failures of neoliberalism in all its dimensions: slower, and more unstable and unequal, growth and social and environmental problems aplenty.
To return to where I began this letter, modern economic theory has explained why, when technology is endogenous (that is, a result of research and development or of what we learn in the process of producing and investing), markets are not in general efficient; some government interventions may be desirable. Industrial policy makes sense. It makes sense for developing countries to try to close the gap in knowledge that separates them from developed countries—this gap is even more important than the gap in resources. These efforts were proscribed by the WTO—it’s as if the WTO was designed to maintain the competitive technological advantage of the developed countries.
But the law of the jungle may be even worse than the flawed WTO rules and especially so for poor countries. It is in the interests of the United States to create a world order based on cooperation and respect—including respect for the United States and its values, not fear of the United States as it abuses its economic, political, and military power. And that means that as Washington devotes funds to develop new industries and, particularly, to make the green transition, it must make funds and technology available to developing countries and emerging markets. If U.S. industrial policy is seen as part of a new global green transition and a transition to a more resilient global economy, it can be part of a new era of global cooperation, and you, as president, will be at the helm of the world’s leading and richest democracy, paving the way to a new global shared prosperity.
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The Trans-Atlantic Partnership Still Matters
From Catherine Ashton, distinguished fellow at the Wilson Center and former European Union high representative for foreign affairs and security policy
An illustration shows a three-legged stool with legs covered in the flags of the U.S., the U.K., ad the EU.Mariaelena Caputi illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Madam or Mr. President,
As you take up the extraordinary challenges before you, I hope you will nurture the partnerships that have sustained the United States through the years. When I became the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, I learned two lessons very quickly: first, that no matter how powerful any nation is, no significant issue can be solved alone. Climate change, pandemics, organized crime, and cyberattacks all require responses beyond borders. Opportunities for our citizens to travel, study, trade, and do business need deals with other countries that last decades or more. Working together with other like-minded nations is vital if we are to keep people secure, grow our economies, and tackle new challenges.
The second lesson was the strength of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Every day, and all day, the flow of information, discussion, and debate across the Atlantic—between Brussels and Washington—was a vital part of doing business. Whether we were seeking to further develop our economies, keep our citizens safe, coordinate our defense strategies, or tackle foreign-policy crises, we were reminded daily of our partnership, based on common values and ideas.
Coming from the United Kingdom, I was mindful of the value of the “special relationship,” as Winston Churchill called it. Speaking in 1946 at the end of World War II, he knew the value of alliances and recognized the crucial way the United States had stood with Britain in its darkest times. He also valued the historical and cultural ties between our two nations. For the U.K., the special relationship has been the bedrock upon which our foreign, defense, and security policies have been forged. In recent times, we have stood together in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and now in Ukraine, facing down Russian aggression. The U.K. is the ever-reliable ally, ready to work with the United States to find answers in a world where crises seem to appear from nowhere.
Politicians since Churchill have interpreted the special relationship in different ways, but each president and prime minister have continued to value it and to rely on it. One reason the relationship is special is that it is unique. The U.K. has both historical ties across the Atlantic and geographical ties across the English Channel. The U.K. became a bridge between the United States and the EU. We relished that role, willing to ensure that U.S. priorities and ideas formed part of the backdrop to decisions on foreign, security, and defense policies within Europe.
Not all presidents or prime ministers have seen the EU as a positive force—or understood the remarkable achievement of what is now 27 countries cooperating every day on economic, security, and political issues. Never easy, it has come under greater strain in recent times as the very foundations of the EU have been challenged, but the union endures despite these pressures.
After I returned from Brussels, Britain took the decision to leave the EU, weakening its own economy and ability to act in the world. Its government ministers promised the opposite: a “global Britain” with grand ambitions to strike deals across the world that would turn the U.K. into a new kind of powerhouse. Reality killed the dream. Our departure from the EU did not just leave us without obvious ways to amplify and add to our foreign-policy priorities. It also undermined a core reason for the United States to value its relationship with us. Our value was lessened, our allure faded. Instead, Washington strengthened its already strong relationships with Berlin, Brussels, and Paris and worked with allies such as Poland under its new government to support Ukraine in its fight to retain its sovereignty.
But there is unquestionably still a role for the U.K. It ranks third after the United States and Germany in NATO defense spending and is regarded as a reliable partner by its allies. More than that, it has a strong diplomatic service and plays an important role in intelligence and security. A new government has been elected on the promise of a reset in relations with the EU, not just in foreign policy and defense but across a range of issues, including environmental ones, that matter to both sides. And in confronting those common challenges, there is a chance to offer the United States something new.
I would define this as becoming the third leg of a three-legged stool that consists of the United States, the EU, and the U.K. All three have much in common. Many Americans speak with pride of their Irish, German, Polish, Italian, or British heritage. And the same values and ideals have made us stand together in the face of aggression and crises.
While the bilateral links between each of the three are significant, a trilateral relationship offers strength and stability. A three-legged stool can carry significant weight without wobbling and is firmly planted on the ground. Each leg plays its part in holding the stool up and enabling it to bear the burdens placed on it. The power of the United States is unquestionable, and the economic strength of the EU is impressive, but the U.K. can add its strength, too, in terms of its intelligence, security, and defense capabilities, its diplomatic reach, and its role in the U.N. Security Council.
As you take office, among challenges both domestic and foreign, I hope the relationship between the U.K. and the United States will continue to be a constant that both our countries can rely on.
The United States may lead in terms of its competition with China and its leadership in artificial intelligence, among many other areas of knowledge and expertise. But the traditional role that the West, and the United States in particular, has played is changing. We can no longer simply assume support from countries across the world for the vision we have or the rules-based order we have produced or expect them to join us in common cause against those who would change it for the worse.
Such challenges make strong alliances, in every field, all the more important. And old, reliable alliances are as much in the interests of the United States as they are of the U.K. and EU, even if they creak from time to time. Our duty is one of constant renewal, to make them stronger. We have no choice but to collaborate to resolve problems—the question is who our allies are and who we can turn to. The three-legged stool is vital to this process.
Things are not the same as when the U.K. was part of the EU, but it is still a strong and determined ally with strong links to Europe, especially through NATO. This alliance would be one Churchill would recognize and I believe would welcome. I hope you, my American friends, would welcome it, too.
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Clean Energy Is Security
From Jason Bordoff, founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy and professor of professional practice at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs
A photo illustration shows a solar panel covered in $100 bills against a blue sky.Mariaelena Caputi illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Madam or Mr. President,
Congratulations on your election as president of the United States. You take office at a moment of enormous consequence for a world directly impacted by the twin challenges of energy security and climate change.
Democrats and Republicans disagree on many aspects of energy and climate policy. Yet your administration has the chance to chart a policy path forward that unites both parties around core areas of agreement to advance the U.S. national interest.
First, all should agree that climate change is real and worsening. The escalating threat of climate change is increasingly evident to anyone walking the streets of Phoenix in the summer, buying flood insurance in southern Florida, farming rice in Vietnam, or laboring outdoors in Pakistan. This year will almost certainly surpass 2023 as the warmest year on record.
Second, just as the energy revolution that made the United States the world’s largest oil and gas producer strengthened it economically and geopolitically, so will ensuring U.S. leadership in clean energy technologies enhance the country’s geostrategic position. In a new era of great-power competition, China’s dominance in certain clean energy technologies—such as batteries and cobalt, lithium, graphite, and other critical minerals needed for clean energy products—threatens America’s economic competitiveness and the resilience of its energy supply chains. China’s overcapacity in manufacturing relative to current and future demand undermines investments in the United States and other countries and distorts demand signals that allow the most innovative and efficient firms to compete in the global market.
Third, using less oil in our domestic economy reduces our vulnerability to global oil supply disruptions, such as conflict in the Middle East or attacks on tankers in the Red Sea. Even with the surge in U.S. oil production, the price of oil is set in the global market, so drivers feel the pain of oil price shocks regardless of how much oil the United States imports. True energy security comes from using less, not just producing more.
Fourth, energy security risks extend beyond geopolitics and require investing adequately in domestic energy supply to meet changing circumstances. Today, grid operators and regulators are increasingly warning that the antiquated U.S. electricity system, already adjusting to handle rising levels of intermittent solar and wind energy, is not prepared for growing electricity demand from electric cars, data centers, and artificial intelligence. These reliability concerns were evident when an auction this summer set a price nine times higher than last year’s to be paid by the nation’s largest grid operator to power generators that ensure power will be available when needed. A reliable and affordable power system requires investments in grids as well as diverse energy resources, from cheap but intermittent renewables to storage to on-demand power plants.
Fifth, expanding clean energy sectors in the rest of the world is in the national interest because doing so creates economic opportunities for U.S. firms, diversifies global energy supply chains away from China, and enhances U.S. soft power in rapidly growing economies. (In much the same way, the Marshall Plan not only rebuilt a war-ravaged Europe but also advanced U.S. economic interests, countered Soviet influence, and helped U.S. businesses.) Doing so is especially important in rising so-called middle powers, such as Brazil, India, or Saudi Arabia, that are intent on keeping their diplomatic options open and aligning with the United States or China as it suits them transactionally.
To prevent China from becoming a superpower in rapidly growing clean energy sectors, and thereby curbing the benefits the United States derives from being such a large oil and gas producer, your administration should increase investments in research and development for breakthrough clean energy technologies and boost domestic manufacturing of clean energy. Toward these ends, your administration should quickly finalize outstanding regulatory guidance to allow companies to access federal incentives. Your administration should also work with the other side of the aisle to provide the market with certainty that long-term tax incentives for clean energy deployment—which have bipartisan support and have already encouraged historic levels of private investment—will remain in place. Finally, your administration should work with Congress to counteract the unfair competitive advantage that nations such as China receive by manufacturing industrial products with higher greenhouse gas emissions. Such a carbon import tariff, as proposed with bipartisan support, should be paired with a domestic carbon fee to harmonize the policy with that of other nations—particularly the European Union’s planned carbon border adjustment mechanism.
Your ability to build a strong domestic industrial base in clean energy will be aided by sparking more domestic clean energy use. This is already growing quickly as market forces respond to rapidly falling costs. Increasing America’s ability to produce energy is also necessary to maintain electricity grid reliability and meet the growing needs of data centers and AI. To do so, your administration should prioritize making it easier to build energy infrastructure at scale, which today is the greatest barrier to boosting U.S. domestic energy production. On average, it takes more than a decade to build a new high-voltage transmission line in the United States, and the current backlog of renewable energy projects waiting to be connected to the power grid is twice as large as the electricity system itself. It takes almost two decades to bring a new mine online for the metals and minerals needed for clean energy products, such as lithium and copper.
The permitting reform bill recently negotiated by Sens. Joe Manchin and John Barrasso is a good place to start, but much more needs to be done to reform the nation’s permitting system—while respecting the need for sound environmental reviews and the rights of tribal communities. In addition, reforming the way utilities operate in the United States can increase the incentives that power companies have not just to build new infrastructure but to use existing infrastructure more efficiently. Such measures include deploying batteries to store renewable energy and rewiring old transmission lines with advanced conductors that can double the amount of power they move.
Grid reliability will also require more electricity from sources that are available at all times, known as firm power. Your administration should prioritize making it easier to construct power plants with advanced nuclear technology—which reduce costs, waste, and safety concerns—and to produce nuclear power plant fuel in the United States. Doing so also benefits U.S. national security, as Russia is building more than one-third of new nuclear reactors around the world to bolster its geostrategic influence. While Russia has been the leading exporter of reactors, China has by far the most reactors under construction at home and is thus poised to play an even bigger role in the international market going forward. The United States also currently imports roughly one-fifth of its enriched uranium from Russia. To counter this by building a stronger domestic nuclear industry, your administration should improve the licensing and approval process of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and reform the country’s nuclear waste management policies. In addition to nuclear power, your administration should also make it easier to permit geothermal power plants, which today can play a much larger role in meeting the nation’s energy needs thanks to recent innovations using technology advanced by the oil and gas sector for shale development.
Even with progress on all these challenges, it is unrealistic to expect that the United States can produce all the clean energy products it needs domestically. It will take many years to diminish China’s lead in critical mineral supply, battery manufacturing, and solar manufacturing. The rate of growth needed in clean energy is too overwhelming, and China’s head start is too great to diversify supply chains away from it if the United States relies solely on domestic manufacturing or that of a few friendly countries. As a result, diminishing China’s dominant position requires that your administration expand economic cooperation and trade partnerships with a vast number of other nations. Contrary to today’s protectionist trends, the best antidote to concerns about China’s clean technology dominance is more trade, not less.
Your administration should also strengthen existing tools that increase the supply of clean energy products in emerging and developing economies in order to diversify supply chains and counter China’s influence in these markets. For example, the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC) can be a powerful tool to support U.S. investment overseas, such as in African or Latin American projects to mine, refine, and process critical minerals. As DFC comes up for reauthorization next year, you should work with Congress to provide DFC with more resources and also change the way federal budgeting rules account for equity investments; this would allow DFC to make far more equity investments even with its existing funding. Your administration can also use DFC to encourage private investment in energy projects in emerging and developing economies by reducing the risk investors face from fluctuations in local currency that can significantly limit their returns or discourage their investment from the start. The U.S. Export-Import Bank is another tool to support the export of U.S. clean tech by providing financing for U.S. goods and services competing with foreign firms abroad.
Despite this country’s deep divisions and polarization, leaders of both parties should agree that bolstering clean energy production in the United States and in a broad range of partner countries around the world is in America’s economic and security interests.
I wish you much success in this work, which will also be the country’s success.
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Muster Global Majorities
From Mark Malloch-Brown, former U.N. deputy secretary-general
An illustration shows a U.S. flag on a long pole propping up a flag globe.Matt Chase illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Madam or Mr. President,
The future of multilateralism might seem too diffuse as to hang on the outcome of one national election—yours—but for diplomats at the United Nations in New York and elsewhere, it does. In part, this is a well-worn cycle, of denigrating U.S. leadership as overreach when it is seen as on the up and being equally quick to condemn its departure as removing the essential anchor when it seems to be abdicating the world stage.
As you know, the United States has in truth been the mainstay of the modern multilateral system since its launch in 1945. Despite occasional threats of divorce—and on occasion actual disengagement from individual U.N. entities and nonpayment of dues—it has not deserted the system as it did the earlier League of Nations.
Much longer periods of relatively low-friction harmony have gone less noticed but reflect the temperament of an American public that has generally held a benign, if not deep, regard for the U.N. You might be surprised to learn that the Pew Research Center reports that 52 percent of Americans view the U.N. favorably in 2024. The U.N. has actually been a useful partner to successive U.S. administrations in global management—from peacekeeping to development. As Franklin D. Roosevelt envisaged, the United States, as the reluctant world police after 1945, was going to need a hand. The multilateral system was molded to provide that.
There was, admittedly, a wider alignment of values at the time. The liberal rules-based international order that prevailed first in competition with the Soviet model and then alone post-1989 and that allowed a rapid growth in open markets and democracy was a shared undertaking led by the United States but generally supported by the multilateral system.
Diplomats are right to believe today that we may be at an inflection point. Though I am writing this before the results of the election are known, to speak bluntly, these diplomats fear a new Trump administration as a threat to the very foundations of the multilateral system. But whoever prevails on Nov. 5—and congratulations, by the way—this will not change the much deeper shifts underway in the distribution of global power and values alignment that are now surfacing at the U.N. and its Bretton Woods cousins, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They have seen an approximate quadrupling of membership since their post-World War II founding; a more than tripling of global population; and a global GDP that is more than 10 times bigger. More recent trends include the fall of the Soviet Union; the surging rise of China; the equally significant new standing of middle powers such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa; as well as a more general ambition of states across the developing world to assert agency and sovereignty in their foreign policy and development strategy. Your country once presumed to preside over a tamer world.
The U.S. role in the multilateral system is sliding. But it is not in free fall—yet. If you set out to do so, could you put it over the edge? Perhaps. But this is no ancient Greece with Rome at its gates. Your national defense spending continues comfortably to be twofold that of China and Russia combined. The United States arguably remains the most innovative economy in the world, and it still tops the league tables of wealth creation and income per capita. The combined population of those countries with higher average incomes—a handful of unequal oil-rich and other small states—is only 25 million. From Olympic medals to Nobel Prizes, the United States remains a country with a deep pool of individual and collective talent to which many of the world’s smartest continue to seek entry. For many talented individuals around the world, it remains the promised land. So leadership remains yours to lose.
But you must see there is a global shift underway, and the United States, more than ever, is not an unchallenged No. 1 but rather a precarious first among equals in a multilateral system and which in responding to wider intellectual and political change in the world resents any claim to monopoly leadership. As Shakespeare observed in his great play on succession and power, Henry IV, Part 2: “Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.”
A broad indication of this shift is provided by the declining share of the global economy enjoyed by the G-7, the club of leading U.S.-aligned economies. According to the World Bank, the G-7 accounted for almost two-thirds of global GDP in 1980; by 2022, the G-7 accounted for only 43 percent.
In a European forum such as NATO, your predecessor Joe Biden was viewed as an unalloyed triumph. Biden’s leadership on Ukraine particularly restored a trans-Atlantic bounce to Europe-U.S. relations. But at the multilateral level, the return of an old-fashioned Atlanticist and pro-Israel president was viewed more ambivalently. His priorities have not been necessarily shared by much of the rest of the world. There is, perhaps, an opportunity to bring a welcome rebalancing toward other regions.
But the more fundamental divide is that what’s good for the United States is more than ever not always good for the rest of the world. This is reflected in both political and security priorities but also economic and trade ones—and in that word again, values. There is a dangerous divergence.
By way of example, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, a well-regarded Biden appointee as U.S. ambassador to the U.N., has struggled to reconcile instructions to isolate Russia for its war in Ukraine while also being required to stand almost alone in her defense of Israel’s actions in Gaza. Charges of double standards and a very different level of respect for civilian life in the two cases have become a key complaint at the U.N. This made Biden’s championing internationally of democracy seem dated and hypocritical. The United States was no longer the shining city on the hill when it came to democratic values. Democracy promotion is seen as a moralistic cover for a more cynical, interest-based U.S. foreign policy. A selective sanction is applied against the weak or America’s enemies but not its friends, such as Saudi Arabia.
You may want to trade in the term democracy for that of freedom. As in the recent U.S. presidential campaign, this resonates. The U.N. Charter follows on from Roosevelt’s original 1941 articulation of the four freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Rather than a narrow demand to emulate America’s flawed system of elections alone, your administration should put itself at the head of this wider inclusive framing that still excludes adversaries such as Xi Jinping’s China and Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This would be a campaign that restores empathy and balance to U.S. leadership and would again muster global majorities.
Similarly, the unfolding competition with China, in which the Biden administration largely took up where the previous administration had left off, has led to protectionist economic policies—including the vast Inflation Reduction Act, which has sought to repatriate U.S. manufacturing jobs to the detriment of many U.S. trade partners; prohibitive tariff barriers denying at least U.S. consumers the potentially world-changing low cost of Chinese electric cars; and the blocking of judicial appointments in the World Trade Organization’s trade disputes appeal system, thereby gumming up the essential governance of world trade arrangements.
You may not care about any one of these consequences in isolation, but overall you should know that in one of the more perverse reversals, many developing countries now feel cheated of the open global trading system that allowed many of their neighbors to get an early foot on the development ladder. Biden’s talk of near-shoring and resilient supply lines is a retreat from the globalization that unleashed decades of development gains. He is seen as pulling away the ladder before poor countries can reap the economic benefits of cheap labor.
A closing U.S. trade system enjoys rare bipartisan support at home, but many in the world hope for a break from it—and a return to an earlier time in U.S. leadership. President Barack Obama has been given a mixed scorecard for his multilateral record largely because of his uncertain handling of political and security issues such as the Arab Spring and notably its aftermath in Syria and Libya. However, on the economic and trade side, he led an enthusiastic shift toward the G-20, which represents around 85 percent of global GDP, over the G-7—and toward Asia and a trade pact whose U.S. participation did not outlive his term. He was said to be privately impatient with a sclerotic U.N. and its history-laden protocol but an eager champion of a renewed and rebalanced multilateralism around an even more inclusive version of the G-20.
More in hope than expectation may I suggest you might consider embracing a reversion of America’s current multilateral posture: At the moment, it is on the offensive on the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars but largely on the defensive on the rest, including secondary conflicts of which there are again a growing number particularly in Africa and the wider Arab world, and on development and climate; on the latter, there is a lot of U.S. exhortation but as little cash as your predecessors could get away with or a rash deployment, in the name of green policies, against, for example, the vital energy needs of the global south. This is a misalignment—indeed, an inversion of priorities. Press for a just peace on Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas, as U.N. resolutions call for—respect for Ukraine’s sovereign boundaries and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—but then pivot to these other priorities. Acknowledge that the long-term global problems of climate and poverty, and linked conflict and migration, threaten us all, including Americans. This is a Roosevelt-sized task for a White House heir who would pick up that mantle.
Don’t expect instant adulation abroad for what will be initially unpopular at home. U.S. leadership is inevitably declining relatively. You will be challenged by others in the multilateral system in ways your predecessors could afford to brush over, but you have to persuade yourself and your prickly America First Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, that international challenge can be healthy. Henry IV rued his uneasy hold on his crown, but amid rebellion and challenge, he exceeded your possible time in office and ushered in a three-generation Lancastrian dynasty. The United States does not need to turn in its crown just yet.
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Strategic Autonomy Is Nothing to Fear
From Nirupama Rao, former Indian foreign secretary and ambassador to the United States and to China
An illustration shows a US flag on a stick folded slightly to reveal the Indian flag on the back.Matt Chase illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Madam or Mr. President,
Seventy-seven years ago, on India’s gaining independence, President Harry S. Truman said that in the United States, India would find a constant friend. It is such constancy that defines the expanding partnership between our two democracies. In the last two decades particularly, we have together achieved spectacular improvements in bilateral relations.
This letter, however, focuses on an area perhaps insufficiently grasped as the United States contemplates the India of today—that is, its self-definition as a civilizational state and its vision of strategic autonomy and multipolarity in global affairs.
The world of 2024 is vastly different from that of 1947, when India gained independence. The rules-based international order to which both our countries have pledged allegiance is in danger of falling apart, and in this season of change, Western dominance is waning. One is reminded of the writer and civil rights activist James Baldwin, who said in reflection in 1961: “The West, the entire West, was changing, was breaking up.”
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East underscore the West’s weakness. Asia is the epicenter of change as countries such as India and China reassert themselves on the global stage. China has led the way with its dramatic rise; its authoritarian, quasi-imperial assertiveness on land and sea borders with its neighbors, including India; and its strategic competition and rivalry with the United States, which have defined new contours of conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
India, too, is taking strides globally. Its presidency of the G-20 in 2023 saw Prime Minister Narendra Modi speak about India’s growing leadership as a “Vishwaguru”—a teacher to the world—and as a nation founded on a civilizational base that stresses the welfare and happiness of all humanity. He referred to the surge of pride in India’s lunar mission, landing on the moon at a spot no one had reached before. India was becoming, Modi said, the voice of the global south, and it would not “bend before anyone.” India’s democracy was a “beautiful gift, a bouquet of hope” for all humanity, and its multilingual and multicultural diversity has imbued it with “great power.”
How should this civilizational power think about forging relationships with other countries? Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar says India’s partners should be “chosen on interests and not on the basis of sentiments or prejudices”—a nationalist diplomacy of Indian exceptionalism. What is seen by many in the country as hectoring by the West over democracy and human rights is rejected outright. At the same time, although India is “non-West,” it sees little profit in “being anti-West.” This image of new and alternative poles of power, as manifest in India, marks the dawn of a multipolar world.
Multipolarity, as India sees it, is what Jaishankar recently termed a “natural expression of global diversity.” While U.S.-China competition looms over the horizon today, power is becoming more diffuse and is no longer concentrated in one or two superpowers. The power of the United States to use its tremendous military power and bases across the world to deter conflict or check aggressive behavior or defeat religious extremism and radicalism (as in Afghanistan) is increasingly in question. At the same time, the image of the United States as a polarized and fractious polity and society is relayed across the world. This provides ample fodder for adversaries such as China and a surrogate Russia to challenge U.S. and Western dominance. Furthermore, many rising and middle powers, with concerns about peace and stability in their regions, including in the global south, are seeking to protect their own geopolitical and economic interests and refusing to be drawn into the web of great-power rivalries.
There is the impression that our American friends are uneasy about India’s vigorously expanding identity. The same week in July that Modi visited Russia, U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti said at a conference in New Delhi: “I respect that India likes its strategic autonomy. But in times of conflict, there is no such thing.” India and the United States would, he said, need to “act together.”
There is no hint of dogma in the Indian approach; it is just the closely held conviction of successive Indian governments from the time of independence onward that the country will not be swayed by bloc politics, alliance systems, or competing ideologies on the global stage and that when a crisis presents itself, India will decide on the course to follow independently, on its merits, and guided by realism.
What makes India’s approach resonate today—and also what makes the United States and others uncomfortable—is that it is propelled by growing military and economic power, the assertion of its civilizational uniqueness, and its increasing geopolitical weight. This creates a new balance of global interests that the West cannot dismiss or ignore.
Certainly, our ties with the United States—though cordial and marked by considerable strategic convergence, particularly in the Indo-Pacific—have recently been strained. Take India’s relations with Russia. Comments such as Garcetti’s, expressing their disappointment about Modi’s visit to Moscow, have sharpened such differences. India has refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although it stresses the importance of dialogue and diplomacy over conflict. Indian imports of oil from Russia over the last two years have grown substantially in the face of U.S. opposition, and Russia continues to be the source of some 40 percent of India’s defense imports. But India argues that its national security and the welfare of its population are paramount, and it is on that basis that India continues to forge ties with Russia.
Nonetheless, the strategic imperatives in the consequential India-U.S. relationship, and their numerous areas of convergence—including in defense and security, trade and investment, energy and technology, global cooperation, and our people-to-people ties—should outweigh such differences.
There will always be some points of contention on foreign-policy issues between our two countries, as there will perhaps be under your administration, but remember that there is no zero-sum game here. The India-Russia relationship, for instance, does not in any way eclipse the indispensable character of the India-U.S. strategic partnership. India’s active membership of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad—with Australia, Japan, and the United States—demonstrates our strategic commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. This investment in many ways has evolved at a much faster pace, and with much more substantive content, than India’s involvement with bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the Russia-India-China trilateral forum, both of which pre-date the Quad.
There has never been a greater need for both our nations to understand each other better. Our democracies seek cooperation, connectivity, and respect for the global commons and the rules-based international order. India’s desire for a steadily improving non-alliance partnership with the United States remains strong and unflinching. It is embedded in the practice of an independent foreign policy with security interests that, by virtue of India’s geographical location, are complex and multifaceted. This is an approach that you will understand because it is not so different from the path that the United States has followed since its inception as a republic.
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Invest in Soft Power
From Joseph S. Nye Jr., distinguished service professor emeritus of Harvard University and author of, most recently, A Life in the American Century
An illustration shows a horseshoe-shaped magnet with a U.S. flag motif attracting a giant crowd of tiny people toward it.Matt Chase illustration for Foreign Policy
Dear Madam or Mr. President,
As president, you will need to invest in U.S. soft power, the ability to get what we want through attraction rather than coercion or payment. When I first published an article on soft power in Foreign Policy in 1990, the concept was new, but the behavior is as old as human history. While the hard power of coercion usually prevails in the short run, soft power is essential for the long-term success of foreign policy. As Talleyrand, Napolean’s foreign minister, is alleged to have said, “You can do everything with bayonets, except sit on them.”
A country’s soft power comes primarily from three sources: its culture; its political values, such as democracy and human rights; and its policies when they are seen as legitimate, because they are framed with awareness of others’ interests. How a government behaves at home in its practice of democracy, in international institutions and alliances where it consults others, and in setting foreign-policy goals such as promoting human rights and responding to global public problems such as climate change determines whether other countries find us attractive or not.
Soft power is the other side of the coin. It is a force multiplier. When you are attractive, you can economize on sticks and carrots. The Roman Empire was maintained by its military but also by the attraction of Roman culture. The United States won the Cold War because of its military and economic strength but also through the attraction of its ideas and values. As the Norwegian scholar Geir Lundestad put it, Cold War Europe was divided into a Soviet and an American empire, but the American one was an “empire by invitation,” while the Soviets had to invade Hungary and Czechoslovakia to maintain theirs.
Today, Russia possesses very little soft power, particularly after its invasion of Ukraine, but China is investing heavily in its soft power. As I describe in my memoir, A Life in the American Century, I developed the term as an analytic concept to round out my description of U.S. power, which many people thought was in decline. Little did I imagine that in 2007, President Hu Jintao would tell the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that China had to increase its investment in soft power. And toward that end, China has spent tens of billions of dollars on Confucius Institutes and its Belt and Road aid program as well as international broadcasting and communications.
China has had mixed returns on its investment. Recent polls have asked citizens of other countries which foreign countries they find attractive. The Pew Research Center surveyed 24 countries last year and reported that majorities in most countries found the United States more attractive than China, with Africa the only continent where the results were close. More recently, Gallup surveyed 133 countries and found that the United States was more attractive in 81 and China in 52. Polls show that U.S. soft power declined in the Donald Trump years. All countries have a degree of national pride, but too narrow a nationalism reduces attraction to others. “America First” can imply that all others’ interests come second. Polls show that U.S. soft power recovered when President Joe Biden reaffirmed our alliances and participation in multilateral institutions.
A few years ago, China’s foreign minister invited me to dinner and asked me how his country could increase its soft power. I told him that he faced two problems that would be difficult to overcome. In Asia, China has territorial disputes with neighbors such as India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which reduce its attraction in those countries. And in the democracies of Europe, the Americas, and Australia, China’s insistence on tight party control over civil society diminishes its attraction. A great deal of a country’s soft power is generated by its civil society, and governments must be careful not to try to overly control it. However, this is difficult for leaders such as Chinese President Xi Jinping to accept.
Over the years, U.S. soft power has had its own ups and downs. In the 1960s, our cities were burning, and we were mired in Vietnam War protests. Bombs exploded in universities and government buildings. The National Guard killed student protesters at Kent State University. We witnessed the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, and the flames were fanned by demagogues such as George Wallace. Yet within a decade, a series of reforms passed Congress, and the honesty of Gerald Ford, the human rights policies of Jimmy Carter, and the optimism of Ronald Reagan helped restore our attractiveness.
The United States, unpopular in many countries during the Vietnam and Iraq wars, found itself deficient again when Trump proclaimed his America First policy. But even during the Vietnam War, when crowds marched around the world to protest U.S. policies, they did not sing the communist “Internationale” but “We Shall Overcome,” an anthem of the Civil Rights Movement. Presidents must remember that an open civil society that allows protest can be a soft-power asset—even if it is politically uncomfortable.
As president, you must remember that government can try to promote culture but it must not try to control it. Invest in the Voice of America and cultural exchange programs, but keep them free even when they annoy you. Political values attract only if a country lives up to them. Preaching democracy abroad will be judged by how well it is practiced at home. Otherwise, statements are dismissed as propaganda and hypocrisy. And definitions of the national interest that open the possibility of joint gains make them more legitimate in the eyes of others.
At a recent meeting of foreign-policy experts, a prominent European told me that he used to worry about a decline in U.S. hard power but now he worried about what was happening internally. He was concerned that our political polarization would affect the soft power that underlies U.S. foreign policy. I told him that the political problem was real but American culture has sources of resilience that go back to our Puritan and Enlightenment origins. We have never been perfect, but our culture encourages us to keep striving to improve. The past 70 years have seen many cycles in the view that the United States is in decline. Pessimists in the past have often underestimated our cultural roots and resilience.
As president, you must remember that the open values of our democratic society and the right to peaceful protest are among the greatest sources of U.S. soft power. Even when mistaken government policies reduce our attractiveness, the ability of American society to criticize itself and correct our own mistakes can make us attractive to others at a deeper level. Protect that ability! It is a source of hope.
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The DDC is an internal system developed by the University of Minnesota Chemical Waste Registry Searchable Database to classify substances through a two-part designation code: the Hazard Class and the Disposal Type. For example, if a substance has a DDC of 02LI then it is a liquid inorganic acid.
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The DDC is an internal system developed by the University of Minnesota Chemical Waste Registry Searchable Database to classify substances through a two-part designation code: the Hazard Class and the Disposal Type. For example, if a substance has a DDC of 02LI then it is a liquid inorganic acid.
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